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DOING BUSINESS WITH GOVERNMENT: ARE
PROSPECTIVE SUPPLIERS ENTITLED TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?
Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius
61 111. App. 3d 163, 377 N.E.2d 1160 (1978)
On June 7, 1978, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First Dis-
trict declared unconstitutional a recently enacted section of the Illinois
Purchasing Act.' The section of the Purchasing Act in question sought
to prohibit state agencies from granting contracts to parties who have
been convicted of the bribery or attempted bribery of state officials. In
Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 2 a case of first impression in Illinois, the
court held that the new section violated the due process clause of the
federal and state constitutions3 because it deprived a small group of
bidders of the opportunity to do business with the State of Illinois
"without some procedural safeguards."' 4
In finding the section unconstitutional on procedural due process
grounds, the Pofyvend court held that bidders on government contracts
have a protectable property interest in doing business with the state
prior to the award of any contract rights.5 In effect, the court found
1. That section of the Illinois Purchasing Act provided:
[njo person or business entity shall be awarded a contract or sub-contract if that
person or business entity: (a) has been convicted of bribery or attempting to bribe an
officer or employee of the State of Illinois in that officer's or employee's official capacity;
or (b) has made an admission of guilt of such conduct which is a matter of record but
has not been prosecuted for such conduct.
For purposes of this Section, where an official, agent, or employee of a business
entity committed the bribery or attempted bribery on behalf of such an entity and pursu-
ant to the direction or authorization of a responsible official thereof, the business entity
shall be chargeable with the conduct.
Public Act 80-964, § I, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.10-1 (1977).
2. 61 Ill. App. 3d 163, 377 N.E.2d 1160 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 51011 (11. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 28, 1978).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
[no person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part:
[n]o State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.
Similar provisions are embodied in the Constitution of the State of Illinois. See ILL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 2 (1970).
4. 61 111. App. 3d at 167, 377 N.E.2d at 1164.
5. The court stated:
[Flor the reasons stated we find that the plaintiff has a property interest which is
protectable under the due process guaranties of the Federal and State constitutions. The
statute, by not providing some procedural safeguards, is in contravention of those rights
and is consequently unconstitutional. The order of the circuit court granting summary
judgment to the plaintiff is reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
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that the legislature lacks the power to establish the terms and condi-
tions under which it will do business. In so finding, the court estab-
lished a new standard for finding due process property interests and has
raised anew previously settled issues in a manner likely to have great
impact upon the future of procedural due process litigation in Illinois.
This comment will outline the constitutional rights of prospective
government contractors6 and the development of the concept of "prop-
erty" as it has evolved in procedural due process cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States.7 It will then apply those concepts
to the facts in the Polyvend case and will contrast the doctrines elabo-
rated by the United States Supreme Court with the reasoning of the
court in Polyvend.8 That comparison will lead to the conclusion that
the Polyvend decision is not consistent with either the procedural due
process opinions of the United States Supreme Court or with the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of Illinois.9 It will also be shown that the
PolYvend opinion provides the basis for an expansion of due process
challenges to presently valid legislative enactments.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BIDDERS
The question of the rights of bidders under the federal constitution
was apparently settled as early as 1940. In Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co. ,'o the United States Supreme Court held that parties wishing to do
business with the government have no standing to challenge either the
government's purchasing decisions or its regulations because bidders
do not have a constitutional right to do business with the government.I
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Black wrote that "[hlike private
individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted
power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it
will deal and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make
needed purchases."' 2 Thus, Justice Black reasoned that the mere loss
of potential income from the denial of participation in government
contracts does not amount to the deprivation of a constitutionally pro-
tected right and that statutes requiring the public advertisement of bids
were enacted for the benefit of the government and the people at
Id. at 168, 377 N.E.2d at 1164.
6. See notes 10-19 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 20-51 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 52-119 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 120-42 infra and accompanying text.
10. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
11. Id. at 127.
12. Id.
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large-not for the benefit of private contractors. 13
In Perkins, the Court specifically held that the legislature had the
power to exclude from participation in government contracts any con-
tractor who failed to pay the minimum wage in the "locality" of the
purchase. 14 Furthermore, the Court found that the possibility that an
administrator might make an erroneous decision in applying the statute
was not a sufficient reason to invalidate the statute because the legisla-
ture had the power to delegate discretion in making such decisions.' 5
The underlying rationale of the Perkins opinion was that, prior to
the award of a government contract, bidders enjoy only those rights
specifically granted by the legislature. 16 Therefore, absent legislation to
the contrary, constitutional protection could not be invoked by bidders
because the legally protectable property interest necessary for the invo-
cation of due process or other constitutional protection did not exist.
However, the question of whether the Perkins doctrine has retained its
constitutional vitality in light of more recent developments in procedu-
ral due process litigation remains to be explored.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Prior to 1970, the touchstone for finding property interests requir-
ing the protection of procedural due process safeguards was found in
the clear-cut distinction between constitutionally created rights and
privileges granted by government largess. 17 Under the then prevailing
doctrine, virtually any government benefit that was not specifically
awarded by the Constitution was held to be outside the ambit of due
13. Justice Black wrote:
[tihat Act does not depart from but instead embodies the traditional principle of
leavin& purchases necessary to the operation of our Government with adequate range of
discretion free from vexatious and dilatory restraints at the suits of prospective or poten-
tial sellers. It was not intended to be a bestowal of litigable rights upon those desirous of
selling to the Government; it is a self-imposed restraint for violation of which the Gov-
ernment-but not private litigants--can complain.
Id.
14. Id. at 116-17.
15. Id. at 125.
16. The issue in Perkins turned on whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the
purchasing procedures of the government. Therefore, the Court discussed the bidder's interest in
terms of "litigable rights." Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated:
[W]e are of the opinion that no legal rights (of respondents] were shown to have been
invaded or threatened in the complaint upon which the injunction of the Court of Ap-
peals was based. It is by now clear that neither damage nor loss of income in conse-
quence of the action of Government, which is not an invasion of recognized legal rihts,
is in itself a source of legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation recognizing
it as such.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. For a discussion of the right-privilege doctrine, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
499
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process protection.' 8 The Perkins decision was clearly consistent with
an analysis based upon that immutable distinction between rights and
privileges. The opportunity to do business with the government, after
all, was not a right granted to all citizens by the Constitution.19
'Entitlements" as Protectable Interests
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court greatly expanded the
applicability of the procedural due process doctrine when it declared,
in Goldberg v. Kelly,20 that the right-privilege distinction had outlived
its usefulness in a changing society.2' The Goldberg case arose out of a
challenge to the procedures used in the termination of payments under
the Aid to Families and Dependent Children program. The Supreme
Court declined to accept the argument that support payments were
privileges which could be denied without prior notice and hearing.
Support payments were held to be subject to procedural due process
protection because such protection was appropriate not only for consti-
tutionally created rights, but also for property interests created by an
"entitlement" to government services. 22 This novel concept would, in
time, provide the basis for finding "entitlement" property interests in
old age benefits, 23 social security disability benefits, 24 unemployment
compensation, 25 public education, 26 and government employment.
27
The post-Goldberg "entitlement" cases had several factors in com-
mon. In each case, the plaintiffs had been excluded by an overreaching
of administrative authority from governmental benefits in which they
had been, or arguably should have been, enrolled. In addition, the
plaintiffs were able to demonstrate a reasonable and substantial reli-
ance upon the benefits which had been denied to them. Although
Goldberg and its progeny established a new standard for finding prop-
18. The right-privilege distinction had been criticized as an overly restrictive limitation upon
the power of the due process clause. The result of this analysis was that virtually all government
benefits fell into the "discretionary" category and were, therefore, subject to arbitrary divestment.
Id.
19. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. at 127.
20. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
21. Id. at 263-64.
22. Id. at 261-62.
23. See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
24. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401-02 (1971).
25. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389-90 (1975), reh. den., 420 U.S. 955 (1975) (re-
manded for consideration under new procedures initiated during appeal).
26. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
27. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (found that the statute did not create a property
interest requiring due process protection); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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erty interests, the rule remained that it was only after such an entitle-
ment-created property interest was found that procedural due process
considerations would arise.
28
The Source of Protected "'Entitlements"
Following the Goldberg opinion, the United States Supreme Court
began to clarify the standards to be applied in determining the circum-
stances which gave rise to entitlements by defining the due process
rights of public employees. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 29 the Court
held that an untenured instructor at a state university did not have an
entitlement to continued employment because the instructor's year to
year contract with the state created no reasonable expectation of con-
tinued employment. 30 Consequently, the Court found that procedural
due process was not required prior to termination of his employment.
The Court in Roth stated that "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.
He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, in-
stead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
' 3 1
In a companion case, Perry v. Sindermann,32 the Court applied the
same reasoning to find that a due process hearing would be appropri-
ate, even for non-contractual employment, if the plaintiff-employee
could show that his expectation of continued employment was reason-
able in light of the terms of employment established by the state.33 The
Court stated that "[a] person's interest in a benefit is a property interest
for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit
understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and
28. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the plaintiff challenged the
post-termination review procedure applied to Social Security disability payments. In deciding
that the procedures were adequate, the Court addressed the threshold "entitlement" question and
concluded that an examination of the procedures used was relevant only after finding "that the
interest of an individual in continued receipt of these benefits [disability payments] is a statutorily
created property interest." 1d. at 332 (emphasis added).
29. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
30. The Roth Court stated that:
[tihe terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-employ-
ment for the next year. They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-
employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or University rule or policy
that secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it. In
these circumstances, the respondent surely had an abstract concern of being rehired, but
he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to give
him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of employment.
Id. at 578.
31. Id. at 577.
32. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
33. Id. at 602-03.
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that he may invoke at a hearing." 34
The source of non-contractual "mutually explicit understandings"
upon which an employee may reasonably rely was referred to in the
Roth opinion. In discussing the source of the interests protected by
procedural due process, the Court stated that "[p]roperty interests, of
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or un-
derstandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of en-
titlement to those benefits. '35 Thus, the conclusion compelled by the
Roth and Perry decisions is that the expectancy of receiving a benefit
may ripen into an entitlement only if the state's own acts, by statute,
rule or contract, give credence to the plaintiffs claim that he reasonably
relied upon the expectancy.
The United States Supreme Court further clarified the source of
entitlements in Arnett v. Kennedy.36 In the Arnett case, the Court held
that a statute which provided exclusive conditions under which em-
ployment could be terminated did create the kind of reasonable expec-
tancy that gave rise to an entitlement to the benefit. 37 The statute in
Arnett provided that the plaintiff, a non-probationary federal em-
ployee, could be fired "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service." 38 The Court concluded that "[t]he federal statute guaran-
teeing appellee continued employment absent 'cause' for discharge
conferred on him a legitimate claim of entitlement which constituted a
'property' interest. . . ,,39 Thus, the Arnett case stands for the propo-
sition that statutory limitations of administrative discretion may be-
come the source of protectable property interests because when the
legislature imposes such limits upon administrators, a reasonable ex-
pectancy arises that the actions of administrators will be undertaken
within the bounds of that discretion.
The Arnett analysis was further developed by the Supreme Court
34. Id. at 601 (emphasis added). The Perry Court remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to
demonstrate that "mutually explicit understandings" were violated in his termination.
35. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
36. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
37. The plaintiff in Arnelt alleged that the procedures employed in his termination violated
his right to due process because they included no provision for a hearing. The administrator had
complied with the procedures required by statute. The Court held that the termination procedures
written into the statute were adequate to protect the property interest created therein. Id.
38. The employee in Arnett was discharged pursuant to the provisions of the Lloyd-La Fol-
lette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1976), which requires that prior to discharging a nonprobationary em-
ployee for cause, the employee must be given advance notice of the charges against him and a
reasonable time to file a written answer.
39. 416 U.S. at 166.
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in Bishop v. Wood.4 0 The plaintiff in Bishop was a municipal employee
who had been discharged by the city manager pursuant to a city ordi-
nance which had been interpreted to vest absolute discretion in the city
manager to hire and fire city employees.4' In applying the Arnett ra-
tionale, the Bishop Court looked to the statutory power exercised by the
city manager to determine whether the employee in Bishop had an enti-
tlement to employment. The court concluded that the employee who
held his position at the sufferance of the city necessarily had no entitle-
ment to employment.
42
Thus, following Arnett and Bishop, the creation by the legislature
of limitations on administrative discretion became a primary source of
entitlement property interests. Conversely, in the absence of legisla-
tively mandated limits on discretionary authority, only those benefits
specifically granted by the Constitution may reasonably be relied
upon.43 It is apparent that the existence of a "right" cannot depend
upon the discretion of the party against whom that right is asserted.
Thus, when the bestowal of government benefits is left to the discre-
tionary power of administrators, those benefits do not constitute a pro-
tectable property interest.44
The "Entitements" of Bidders
The rights of employees to government employment are closely
analagous to those of government contractors discussed in the Perkins
opinion some thirty five years earlier.45 In other words, government
employees, like bidders, have neither a legally protectable interest in
government benefits nor a basis, therefore, for alleging a denial of pro-
cedural due process absent the creation of such rights by the govern-
ment.46
The conclusion that these same principles apply to government
purchasing activities is buttressed by Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly,47 in which he stated that "it is true, of
course, that some governmental benefits may be administratively termi-
40. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
41. Id at 345.
42. Id. at 345 n.8.
43. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
44. See generally, Note, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 YALE L.J. 695
(1977).
45. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
46. In Arnett v. Kennedy, the Supreme Court stated that "[n]o property would have been
conferred, for example, where the applicable statutory or contractual terms, either expressly or by
implication, did not provide for continued employment absent 'cause'. " 416 U.S. 134, 167 n.2
(1974).
47. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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nated without affording the recipient a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing. '48 As an example of the kind of benefit which might be so
denied, Justice Brennan cited Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.4 9 for the
proposition that the state has absolute discretion in purchasing unless
the legislature expressly limits that discretion.
50
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the expansion of the
due process doctrine following the Goldberg decision has not been ex-
tended into areas of legislatively granted discretion. Absent the impo-
sition of statutory limitations upon administrative authority to hire or
purchase, neither government employees nor government bidders have
a property interest which can be invoked for due process purposes.
5'
POLYVEND INC. V. PUCKORIUS
Factual Background of the Polyvend Opinion
On October 1, 1977, the General Assembly of the State of Illinois
enacted into law a new section of the Illinois Purchasing Act which
provides:
[n]o person or business entity shall be awarded a contract or sub-con-
tract if that person or business entity: (a) has been convicted of brib-
ery or attempting to bribe an officer or employee of the State of
Illinois in that officer or employee's official capacity; or (b) has made
an admission of guilt of such conduct which is a matter of record but
has not been prosecuted for such conduct.
For purposes of this Section, where an official, agent or employee of
a business entity committed the bribery or attempted bribery on be-
half of such an entity and pursuant to the direction or authorization
of a responsible official thereof, the business entity shall be chargea-
ble with the conduct.
52
Another section of the Illinois Purchasing Act requires that any con-
tract entered into by state administrators which failed to comply with
the new provisions would be void as a matter of law.53 Therefore, once
an administrator determined that a supplier was not in compliance
with the statute, the administrator was obligated to reject the supplier's
bid.
On October 12, 1977, the Illinois Department of General Services
48. Id. at 263 (footnote omitted).
49. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
50. 391 U.S. at 263 n.10.
51. See discussion in text accompanying notes 10-44 supra.
52. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.10-1 (1977).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.10 (1977) provides:
Any contract entered into or purchase or expenditure of funds by a State agency in
violation of this Act or the rules and regulations adopted in pursuance of this Act is void
and of no effect.
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opened bids for the manufacture of the 1979 multi-year motor vehicle
license plates. The only bid submitted was that of plaintiff, Polyvend,
Inc. On November 18, 1977, the assigned state purchasing agent noti-
fied Polyvend, Inc. by letter that the license plate bid had been rejected
pursuant to the state's power to "reject any and all bids" and in con-
formity with the newly enacted statute. 54 The reason for the rejection
was that the plaintiffs own bid and a Dun and Bradstreet report re-
vealed that a Mr. Patrick Stoltz, the former president of an entity called
Metal Stamping Corporation, was the president of Polyvend, Inc.
55
The purchasing agent had determined that this was the same Patrick
Stoltz who had pleaded guilty, on March 6, 1974, to bribing former
Illinois Secretary of State, Paul Powell.56 During Mr. Powell's tenure,
and for some years thereafter, Metal Stamping Corporation had been
the successful bidder on the annual license plate contract.57 Corporate
documents submitted with the bid, or available as a matter of public
record, showed that Polyvend, Inc., had been created some ninety days
after the conviction of Mr. Stoltz by merging Metal Stamping Corpora-
tion into a former subsidiary, Polyvend, Inc.58 Apparently, the admin-
istrator determined that Mr. Stoltz and Polyvend, Inc. were precisely
the sort of bidders which the legislature sought to exclude from partici-
pation in state contracts.
59
The trial court rejected the company's plea for injunctive relief
and the license plate contract was re-bid pursuant to the procedures of
the Illinois Purchasing Act. 60 Polyvend, Inc. did not bid on the second
contract and the contract was let to another supplier.61 The plaintiff
did not allege an abuse of administrative discretion in the finding that
it was in violation of the statute and did not utilize the administrative
appeal procedures which were available for challenging erroneous
purchasing decisions.
62
54. See Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 61 111. App. 3d. 163, 164, 377 N.E.2d 1160, 1161 (1978),
appeal docketed No. 51011 (111. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1978).
55. Id., 377 N.E.2d 1160.
56. Id.
57. See Petition for Leave to Appeal at 5, Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 61 111. App. 3d 163,
377 N.E.2d 1160 (1978), appeal docketed No. 51011 (111. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1978).
58. 61 111. App. 3d at 164, 377 N.E.2d at 1161.
59. See Petition for Leave to Appeal at 5, Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 61 Il. App. 3d 163,
377 N.E.2d 1160 (1978), appeal docketed No. 51011 (I11. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1978).
60. 61 App. 3d 163, 377 N.E.2d 1160.
61. Id.
62. Id. It should be noted that plaintiffs failure to allege an error in the determination made
by the administrator should have precluded consideration of the due process issues since there
were no factual disputes to be raised at a subsequent hearing. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624,
627 (1977).
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The Reasoning of the Court
On appeal, Polyvend, Inc. chose to attack the statute itself rather
than its application by the Illinois Department of General Services.
63
The plaintiff did not introduce any evidence that the application of the
statute was in error.64 Although several challenges to the statute were
incorporated in the Polyvend appeal,65 the Appellate Court of Illinois
for the First District decided the case solely on the issue of procedural
due process. 66 The court found that the plaintiff had a property right
which was violated because the particular section of the Illinois
Purchasing Act did not contain any notice or hearing provisions. 67 The
court concluded that the company's due process rights were violated
because:
[t]he plaintiff did not simply lose a bid on a contract. The plaintiff
has been forever barred from bidding on any contract based on a
determination by an administrative agency without any procedural
safeguards. The interest here is not merely a potential opportunity to
perform a contract with the State of Illinois. Here the powers of gov-
ernment are directed toward an individual barring him from an op-
portunity to contract to supply goods and services to government.
This is a significant aspect of commercial life and a State's determi-
nation to absolutely bar participation in it requires procedural safe-
guards.6
8
In reaching the conclusion that a property right had been violated, the
Polyvend court reviewed but did not analyze the contentions of the par-
ties on the issue of procedural due process.69 Polyvend, Inc. contended
that the statute finds an entity guilty of bribery by "legislative fiat"
without notice, hearing or review.70 The defendant argued that due
process safeguards would attach only if a property right was involved
and that bidders do not have a right to perform government contracts. 71
The Polyvend court recognized that the Perkins opinion makes
clear that no citizen has a right to do business with the state.72 How-
ever, the court cited an Illinois Supreme Court opinion, Bio-Medical v.
63. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 61 111. App. 3d 163, 377 N.E.2d
1160 (1978), appeal docketed No. 51011 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1978).
64. Petition for Leave to Appeal at 5.
65. On appeal, Polyvend, Inc. argued that the statute: (1) was retroactively applied; (2) is a
Bill of Attainder; (3) is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) invalidly delegates legislative power to
an administrator. Id. at 6-18.
66. 61 111. App. 3d at 164-65, 377 N.E. 2d at 1162.
67. Id. at 168, 377 N.E.2d at 1164.
68. Id. at 167, 377 N.E.2d at 1163.
69. id. at 165-66, 377 N.E.2d at 1162-63.
70. Id. at 165, 377 N.E.2d at 1162.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 166, 377 N.E.2d at 1162.
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Trainor,73 which "distinguished" Perkins.74 The plaintiff in Bio-
Medical was a medical laboratory which received over ninety percent
of its income from Medicaid payments. The laboratory had been con-
tinuously enrolled as a qualified Medicaid vendor for over seven
years.75 The Bio-Medical court found that the plaintiff "posscsses a le-
gal interest which is threatened, that being the expectation of continu-
ing to receive Medicaid payments on behalf of Medicaid recipients it
services. ' 76 In referring to the Bio-Medical opinion, the Polyvend court
asserted that "this expectation interest [receiving Medicaid payments]
had been recognized as a protectable property interest. ' 77 However,
the court did not explain why the expectation of receiving Medicaid
payments was a protectable property interest nor did it explain how the
property interest had arisen. Furthermore, the court did not discuss
how Bio-Medical and Polyvend could be distinguished from Perkins.
The Polyvend court simply stated that "here as in Bio -Medical Labora-
tories, Inc., the plaintiffs relationship must be analyzed and cannot be
dismissed under the rubric of Perkins that the plaintiff has no right to
perform government contracts.
'78
After asserting that the Perkins rationale might not apply to the
facts in Polyvend, the court relied on the rationale of Gonzalez v.
Freeman,79 a federal district court case which dealt with the debarment
of a government contractor. In Gonzalez, the plaintiffs Thomas P.
Gonzalez, Carmen Gonzalez, Gonzalez Corp. and others were tempo-
rarily debarred from doing business with the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration pending an investigation into the misuse of official commodity
inspection certificates.80 Prior to the debarment, plaintiff Thomas P.
Gonzalez had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor arising from the misuse
of such certificates. The Polyvend court noted that in Gonzalez the de-
barment was found to have been "imposed without observance of.pro-
cedural safeguards and hence in excess of statutory jurisdiction and
authority.""' Although the Polyvend court recognized that Gonzalez
was decided on federal statutory grounds, it applied the Gonzalez ra-
tionale to the constitutional issues in Polyvend. The court cited
Gonzalez for the principle that:
73. 68 11.2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977).
74. 61 111. App. 3d at 166, 377 N.E.2d at 1162.
75. 68 I11.2d 540, 545, 370 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1977).
76. Id. at 544, 377 N.E.2d at 226.
77. 61 111. App. 3d at 166, 377 N.E.2d at 1163.
78. Id.
79. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
80. Id. at 572.
81. 61 11. App. 3d at 165, 377 N.E.2d at 1162.
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[d]isqualification from bidding or contracting for five years directs
the power and prestige of government at a particular person and, as
we have shown, may have a serious economic impact on that person.
Such debarment cannot be left to administrative improvisation on a
case-by-case basis. The governmental power must be exercised in
accordance with accepted basic legal norms. Considerations of basic
fairness require administrative regulations establishing standards for
debarment and procedures which will include notice of specific
charges, opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, all culminating in administrative findings and con-
clusions based on the record so made.
82
The Polyvend court concluded that Gonzalez could not be distinguished
from Poyvend.83 However, the court did not take cognizance of the
statutory analysis upon which the entire Gonzalez opinion was pre-
mised. Nor did it note that Gonzalez was decided six years before the
United States Supreme Court had begun to establish the method for
finding entitlement property interests.84
The court in Polyvend went on to state that due to a "determina-
tion of an administrative agency without any procedural safeguards,"
the plaintiff was forever barred from bidding on state contracts.
85
However, the court did not discuss whether the administrative agency
had been empowered by the legislature to make that determination or
whether the legislature intended procedural safeguards to be applica-
ble. The court simply borrowed language from Gonzalez to conclude
that "[hiere the powers of government are directed toward an individ-
ual barring him from the opportunity to contract to supply goods and
services to the government. This is a significant aspect of commercial
life and a state's determination to absolutely bar participation in it re-
quires procedural safeguards.'8 6 The Polyvend court failed to note that
the purchasing agent in Polyvend, unlike the Secretary of Agriculture in
Gonzalez or the Director of Public Aid in Bio-Medical, was under a
legislative mandate to act precisely as he did.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLYVEND OPINION
Apparently, the aspects of the company's bid rejection which most
troubled the Polyvend court were the potentially permanent nature of
82. Id. at 166, 377 N.E.2d at 1163 (citing Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d at 578 (emphasis
added)).
83. 61 111. App. 3d at 167, 377 N.E.2d at 1163.
84. The landmark "entitlement" case is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See the
discussion of Goldberg in the text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
85. 61 111. App. 3d at 167, 377 N.E.2d at 1162.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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the rejection and the alleged lack of prior notice and a hearing. 87 Since
it was not argued that the administrator in question abused his statu-
tory authority, the issue on appeal should properly have been limited to
whether the legislature's grant of authority to an administrator to make
determinations which debar particular persons from participation in
state contracts amounted to the denial of a property interest. It is only
after finding such an interest that procedural due process analysis is
relevant. 88 In support of the analysis that a property interest arises
when the legislature, through its administrators, declines to do business
with a particular class of bidders, the court relied primarily on Bio-
Medical v. Trainor89 and Gonzalez v. Freeman90 for the proposition that
the Perkins "governmental freedom to contract" rule does not apply to
this case.91
Bio-Medical v. Trainor
A review of the Bio-Medical opinion, in light of the principles es-
tablished by the United States Supreme Court for determining whether
an "entitlement" property interest exists,92 does not lead to the conclu-
sion reached by the Polyvend court. In Bio-Medical, the plaintiff was a
corporation whose primary source of revenue was payments received
under the federal Medicaid system.93 As the result of an audit which
disclosed probable, but unproved, overpayments totaling more than
$300,000.00, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid
threatened to suspend the plaintiff from the program. 94 The court in
Bio-Medical applied a twofold analysis to determine whether the plain-
87. The court stated that "[tihe plaintiff did not simply lose a bid on a contract. The plaintiff
has been forever barred from bidding on any contract based on a determination by an administra-
tive agency without any procedural safeguards .... Debarring of a person from any opportunity
to contract with the government is a protectable interest." Id.
88. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
89. 68 Ill.2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977).
90. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
91. The Polyvend court stated that:
[t]he [Bio-Medica/] court, in distinguishing Bio-Medical from Perkins, said that the
plaintiff 'possesses a legal interest which is threatened, that being its expectation of con-
tinuing to receive Medicaid payments on behalf of Medicaid recipients it services.' Citing
Hathway [v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976)] and Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d
602 (2d Cir. 1975), the Bio-Medical court stated that this expectation interest had been
recognized as a protectable property interest. Here, as in Bio-Medical, the plaintiffs
relationship with the government must be analyzed and cannot be dismissed under the
rubric of Perkins that the plaintiff has no right to perform government contracts.
Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 61 Il. App. 3d 163, 166, 377 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (1978), appeal
docketed No. 51011 (111. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1978).
92. See text accompanying notes 20-44 supra.
93. Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 1ll.2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977). The
federal Medicaid system is administered in Illinois by the Illinois Department of Public Aid.
94. Id.
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tiff had a property interest requiring due process protection. First, it
was determined that the agency's threatened suspension of the plaintiff
amounted to an interruption of an ongoing relationship upon which the
plaintiff relied for over ninety percent of its income. Second, that reli-
ance was found to be reasonable because "[nione of these provisions [of
the applicable statute] permit or suggest that the Director of Public Aid
has the authority to permanently suspend or terminate a vendor who,
pursuant to the Director's findings, has committed an abuse of the pro-
gram."95
Thus, the entitlement in Bio-Medical did not arise merely because
an "expectation interest has been recognized as a protectable legal in-
terest" or because such expectation was a "significant aspect of com-
mercial life" as suggested by the court in Polylvend.9 6  Rather, the
entitlement arose because the expectation was based upon the mutually
explicit understanding that the Director of Public Aid was without stat-
utory power to foreclose previously qualified Medicaid vendors from
participation in the program.97 Therefore, Bio-Medical does not stand
for the proposition that any expectation interest may become an entitle-
ment property interest if it is "significant." Rather, like the entitlement
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, 98 the Bio-Medical
court determined that the legislature's limitation of administrative dis-
cretion in debarring participants created the interest to be protected. 99
The Bio-Medical opinion is consistent with the analysis employed
by the United States Supreme Court in the employment cases'0° be-
cause it recognized that the Perkins doctrine, although viable, does not
protect administrative actions which exceed the statutory powers of the
administrator in question.' 0 ' The Polyvend court incorrectly concluded
95. Id. at 553, 370 N.E.2d at 229.
96. 61111. App. 3d at 166-67, 377 N.E.2d at 1163.
97. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
98. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975), reh. den., 420 U.S.
955 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971);
Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
99. The court found that:
(plursuant to the expressed provisions of the Code, any Medicaid vendor who is properly
licensed ... and who complies with the Director's rules and regulations relating to rec-
ord keeping, disclosure, dispensation of services, or rules concerning the quality and
quantity of medical assistance for which payment may be authorized, is entitled to re-
ceive payment for services provided to Medicaid recipients.
68 1ll.2d at 546-48, 370 N.E.2d at 226-27.
100. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also the
discussion of the employment cases in the text accompanying notes 29-44 supra.
101. See Bio-Medical v. Trainor, 68 Ill.2d 540, 547, 370 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1977).
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that Bio-Medical stands for the proposition that the legislature may not
define the authority of administrators to carry out purchasing or other
governmental functions. 102
The continued viability of the Perkins doctrine in Illinois has been
recognized by federal courts in cases which have interpreted Illinois
law.10 3 Furthermore, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth
District had previously recognized, in Alfred Engineering v. Fair Em-
ployment Practices Commission,'04 that the Perkins rule is viable in Illi-
nois. In rejecting a challenge to the Illinois Fair Employment Act
which prohibits the granting of state contracts to parties who have com-
mitted discriminatory employment practices, the Alfred Engineering
court stated that "[i]t is clear. . . that the rationale of Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co. . . . insofar as it relates to governmental freedom to contract
is applicable in Illinois."105 The court went on to observe that "[i]n
Bradley v. Casey, . . . our Supreme Court quoted with approval lan-
guage to the effect that a contractor is not allowed to do public work in
any mode he may choose to adopt without regard to the wishes of the
state." 106 This line of reasoning is grounded in the same analysis ap-
plied by the United States Supreme Court in Perkins0 7  and
Goldberg.'°8 The government enjoys the power to contract under any
terms it finds necessary or beneficial. This conclusion remains un-
changed by the Bio-Medical opinion. 109
Gonzalez v. Freeman
The second major case relied on by the Polyvend court was Gonza-
102. The Bio-Medical court found that the legislature had made provisions for the Illinois
Attorney General to investigage alleged cases of fraud and to prosecute these cases if necessary.
The court held that "the total absence of standards, criteria or procedures for terminating or sus-
pending vendors, coupled with the express delegation of enforcement responsibilities, is persua-
sive evidence that the legislature did not intend to confer on the defendant the authority now
claimed." Id. at 553-54, 370 N.E.2d at 229. Furthermore, the cases cited in Bio-Medical for sup-
port of the proposition that a property interest existed in that case involved the abuse of legisla-
tively granted discretion or abuse of constitutional powers by the executive branch of government.
See e.g., City of Chicago v. F.E.P.C., 65 1l1.2d 108, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976); Buettell v. Walker, 59
lll.2d 146, 319 N.E.2d 502 (1974).
103. See, e.g., Estey Corp. v. Matzke, 431 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. I11. 1976); Southern Ill. Bldr's
Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
104. 19 11. App. 3d 592, 312 N.E.2d 61 (1974).
105. Id. at 601, 312 N.E.2d at 67.
106. Id.
107. See the discussion of Perkins in the text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
108. See the discussion of Goldberg in the text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
109. It should be noted that the Bio-Medical court's discussion of Perkins was limited to the
issue of standing. Bio-Medical properly held that Perkins could not be invoked to prevent the
plaintiff from litigating the issue of whether the Director of Public Aid had the statutory authority
to carry out a debarment. The issue of whether there was an abuse of statutory authority is not
addressed in Perkins.
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lez v. Freeman."10 The Gonzalez opinion was cited by the court in
Polyvend because it, too, dealt with the issue of the debarment of par-
ticipants in a government program. The plaintiff corporation in
Gonzalez was prohibited from participation in Commodity Credit Cor-
poration contracts because its president pleaded guilty to a misde-
meanor for the misuse of official inspection certificates. " ' I The court in
Gonzalez, however, found that "Congress has not made explicit provi-
sion for barring contractors doing business with Commodity Credit."" 
2
Therefore, the Polyvend court was correct in pointing out that
"Gonzalez was decided on federal statutory grounds and not on the
basis of the Constitution." '" 3 The court, however, was incorrect in con-
cluding that the rationale of the Gonzalez opinion was equally applica-
ble to the facts in Polyvend."l4 The court in Polyvend also erred in
failing to differentiate the source of administrative authority to debar
contractors from the source of the legislature's power to require such
debarment. Whereas, the legislature's power to deny participation in
government benefits flows directly from its constitutionally derived
power, 15 the power of administrators, as in the Gonzalez case, is deter-
mined entirely by the statute which defines the functions and powers of
the particular administrative agency." 6 Therefore, the rationale of
Gonzalez is not applicable to Polyvend. In Polyvend the administrator
carried out the dictates of the legislature but in Gonzalez the adminis-
trator exceeded his statutory authority.
The Gonzalez opinion pointed out that it was Congress' failure to
specifically grant the power to debar bidders which gave rise to the
need for procedural protections.' '7 The rationale of Gonzalez was that
110. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
III. The court found that under § 10(a,b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009(a,b) (1958) and of § 203(h) of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as amended 7 U.S.C.
§ 1622(h) (1958), the Secretary of Agriculture's discretion was impliedly limited by the legislature.
334 F.2d at 575.
112. 334 F.2d at 576.
113. 61 111. App. 3d at 166, 377 N.E.2d at 1163.
114. See 61 111. App. 3d at 166, 377 N.E.2d at 1163.
115. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
116. See Bio-Medical v. Trainor, 68 Il1.2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977). The BioA-Medical court
stated that "ItIhis court has consistently held that, inasmuch as an administrative agency is a
creature of statute, any power or authority claimed by it must find its source within the provisions
of the statute by which it is created." 1d. at 551, 370 N.E.2d at 228.
117. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964). District Judge Burger, now
Chief Justice Burger, made clear that the reason for the court's opinion was that "Inlothing in the
statute confers unreviewable finality on determinations of the Secretary as to questions of the scope
of his congressional authority or the requisite procedural safeguards." Id.
It is important to note that although Gonzalez was decided long before the "entitlement"
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, the Polyvend court ignored the stand-
ards contained in these cases for finding a property interest. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the
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since Congress had not clearly indicated that the plaintiff should be
debarred for the acts admitted or that the administrator had the power
to forclose the plaintiffs participation, the plaintiff was entitled to pro-
cedural due process."l 8 Absent a clear expression of legislative intent to
require debarment as a penalty, a reasonable expectation of continued
participation in government contracts might well arise. However, even
the Gonzalez opinion held that a protected interest would not have
arisen had Congress vested authority in the administrator to debar par-
ties in plaintifis circumstances.' 19
The "'Entitlements" of Polyvend
The Illinois Purchasing Act and the Purchasing Rules give no in-
dication that the legislature intended to give up its power to define and
delegate its purchasing authority as it sees fit. Section 4 of the Illinois
Purchasing Act specifically reserves complete discretion in purchasing
decisions to the agencies charged with the responsibility of carrying out
the dictates of the legislature. 20 Prior to the Polyvend opinion a similar
legislative enactment was interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court to strip potential contractors of the standing needed to challenge
purchasing decisions.' 2 1 Furthermore, the plaintiffs own bid expressly
recognized that the state reserved the right to accept or reject any or all
bids submitted. 22 In addition, the Purchasing Rules provide that "[i]f
it appears in the best interest of the State of Illinois, all bids may be
rejected, and invitations to bid containing the same or rewritten terms
and specifications may be reissued."'
23
A review of the applicable sections of the Illinois Purchasing Act
and the Purchasing Rules makes it difficult to determine the source of
the property interest which the court found to arise from Polyvend,
Gonzalez court roughly parallels the reasoning of later Supreme Court decisions. See text accom-
panying notes 16-44 supra.
118. The Gonzalez opinion recognized that "[i]t is ... correct ... to say that no citizen has a
'right,' in the sense of a legal right, to do business with the government." 334 F.2d at 574.
The court went on to find that "[o]n allegation of facts which reveals an absence of legal
authority or basic unfairness presents a justiciable controversy [because the] [i]nteruption of an
existing relationship between the government and a contractor places the latter in a different pos-
ture from one initially seeking government contracts." Id. at 574-75 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 575.
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.4 (1977) states in pertinent part:
[any and all bids may be rejected, and when all bids are rejected, a readvertisement for
bids therefor shall be published in the same manner as the original advertisement.
The Illinois legislature also has granted authority to the Department of General Services to
screen potential bidders. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.6 (1977).
121. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
122. See Petition for Leave to Appeal at 14, Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 61 111. App. 3d 163,
377 N.E.2d 1160 (1978), appeal docketed No. 51011 (111. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1978).
123. State of Illinois, Purchasing Rules and Regulations § 17 (para. h.) (Oct. i, 1975).
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Inc.'s debarment. In addition to bribers, the Act and the Rules require
that other types of bidders must be excluded from state contracts. For
example, state officials 24 and discriminatory employers 25 cannot be
awarded certain state contracts. Administrators have discretionary au-
thority to determine which bidders fit the classifications 26 and must
decline the bid of any bidder who falls into the group. 27 These ad-
ministrative findings, like the administrative findings in Polyvend, are
subject to administrative appeal.
1 28
The standards set forth in the procedural due process cases of the
United States Surpeme Court make it clear that the legislature has the
power to procure needed services according to its own terms. 29 The
terms established by statute in Illinois at the time of the Polyvend deci-
sion vested that power in the purchasing agencies. 30 Under such cir-
cumstances, it is difficult to conceive that any expectancy could arise,
much less the kind of reasonable expectancy "supported by rule or stat-
ute" which might give rise to an entitlement.'
3'
In Bishop v. Wood,' 32 the United States Supreme Court found that
the statute in question did not give rise to a property interest because it
vested discretionary authority in the city manager to hire and fire as he
saw fit. Similarly, the statutes and rules which govern government
purchasing in Illinois clearly vest the discretionary power to reject any
and all bids in administrative agencies. By repeatedly serving notice
that administrators may reject any bid without procedural safeguards,
the Illinois General Assembly has made clear that no bidder has a pro-
tected property interest in having its bid accepted or considered for any
state contract. Any bidder, not only those which have admitted brib-
ery, may find that its bid has been rejected because of a "determination
by an administrative agency without any procedural safeguards."'
33
Purchasing agents, for example, may determine that a bidder lacks the
expertise to perform a contract; that contract specifications are improp-
erly drawn or are not met by a bidder; that the price is too high; or that
granting any contract at all would simply not be in the best interests of
the state. Any of these determinations may be made on any bid with-
124. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 132.11-1, 132.11-4 (1977).
125. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.10(g) (1977).
126. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.10(h) (1977).
127. See note 53 supra.
128. See State of Illinois, Purchasing Rules and Regulations § 28 (Oct. 1, 1975).
129. See text accompanying notes 10-44 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 120-23 supra.
131. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 602 (1972).
132. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
133. Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 167, 377 N.E.2d at 1163.
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out notice and hearing. Such a reservation of discretionary authority to
carry out the legislature's purchasing functions can hardly be said to
create the kind of "mutually explicit understandings" that might give
rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to any state contract.134 And,
without an entitlement or other property interest to be protected, no
bidder has a basis for challenging bid rejections on procedural due
process grounds. 3 5 Thus, to hold as does the court in Polyvend, that a
bidder which has been excluded from state contracts by statute pos-
sesses protectable property interests not shared by bidders in general, is
neither logically consistent nor legally sound.
The Perkins "governmental freedom to contract" rule clearly es-
tablishes that the government has the absolute right to determine the
terms and conditions according to which it will do business. 136 Thus,
the Illinois General Assembly's pronouncement in the Purchasing Act
that state purchasing agents must refrain from granting contracts to
those who have illegally interfered with purchasing decisions 37 is a le-
gitimate exercise of that right. In holding that the legislature cannot
establish its own method for determining which bidders qualify for
state contracts, the Polyvend court improperly substituted its own opin-
ion as to which procedures will best protect the state's interests for the
opinion of the legislature. In sum, the Polyvend court ignored the con-
tinuing validity of Perkins and thus its opinion casts doubt upon the
future ability of the Illinois legislature to determine the terms and con-
ditions according to which it will carry on business with the private
sector.
Due to its misunderstanding of the Bio-Medical and Gonzalez
opinions, the Polyvend court did not correctly apply Perkins. Specifi-
cally, the Polyvend court failed to note that both Bio-Medical and
Gonzalez found due process violations because the respective debar-
ments were not authorized by the legislature. 38 Indeed, the court
never considered whether the legislature has the right to authorize a
debarment pursuant to its right to do business on its own terms.
This error was compounded by the court's apparent misapprehen-
sion of the source of property interests described by the United States
Supreme Court in the post-Goldberg entitlement cases. 139 The essence
of these cases is that before due process safeguards apply an expecta-
134. See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
135. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
136. See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.10 (1977).
138. See text accompanying notes 73-84 supra.
139. See the discussion of the entitlement cases in the text accompanying notes 20-44 supra.
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tion must be supported by statutes or rules which indicate that the
plaintiff is "entitled" to the government benefit. If there are statutes or
rules in Illinois which support Polyvend, Inc.'s expectation of receiving
state contracts, they are not embodied in the Purchasing Act and were
not disclosed in the Polyvend opinion. The result of the court's careless
analysis is that it is not clear how the court found that a property inter-
est arose in Polyvend or how such interests will be found to arise in the
future.
The failure of the Polyvend court to clearly identify the source of
the plaintiff's property right is likely to encourage a variety of interpre-
tations as to how property rights arise and thus foster extensive due
process litigation. In addition, the Polyvend opinion has the deleterious
effect of blurring both the previously settled rights of bidders and the
extent of the legislature's power to do business on its own terms. If the
Polyvend decision is upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois on the
same grounds as those relied upon by the Polyvend court, the case
might well be subject to at least four interpretations.
One interpretation is that the legislature no longer has the right or
power to statutorily bar particular types of persons from participating
in government benefits. Under this analysis, it would be possible to
argue that presently valid statutes which specifically prohibit state offi-
cials from participating in state contracts might also be constitutionally
infirm. In addition, statutes which condition participation in state con-
tracts upon non-discriminatory employment practices, like the statute
in the A/fred Engineering decision, 40 might also come under attack.
A second interpretation of the Polyvend holding is that even if the
legislature has the power to exclude certain parties from governmental
benefits, it may not delegate that power to administrative discretion.
This raises the possibility that the legislature could not grant authority
to state administrators to determine the suitability of state job appli-
cants for employment without due process review. In sum, the most
damaging aspect of this interpretation would be the possibility of call-
ing into question the authority of any administrator to operate within
the bounds of his statutory responsibility.
Another potentially onerous interpretation is that Polyvend estab-
lishes the principle that an "expectation" interest amounts to a protect-
able property interest even without the "mutually explicit
understandings" required by the procedural due process cases of the
140. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra for a discussion of Alfred Engineering v. Fair
Employment Practices Commission, 19 111. App. 3d 592, 312 N.E.2d 61 (1974).
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United States Supreme Court. 141 Conceivably, bidders and other par-
ties may now demand due process protection for rights not granted by
statutes, rules or the Constitution. If bidders who have notice that "any
and all bids may be rejected"' 142 possess an entitlement property inter-
est in government contracts, it would seem that any party who desires a
government benefit would have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
benefit under this interpretation; even parties whose income tax return
clearly revealed their ineligibility for income assistance payments as
defined by statute could legitimately demand notice and a hearing
before they could be denied such benefits.
Finally, the effect of Polyvend on state purchasing activities will be
direct and potentially far reaching. If the power of the legislature to set
the terms and conditions under which it will do business may be chal-
lenged without the consent of the legislature, the entire procurement
process is theoretically open to attack. After Polyvend, the legislature's
power to require financial responsibility of its suppliers is less clear.
The power of administrators to require certain products and to reject
others is also open to question. Even the power of the legislature and
the state's administrators to reject irresponsible bidders is in doubt.
The answer to these problems is, of course, a recognition that state
purchasing must be undertaken at the discretion of the legislature. If
there are to be restrictions upon that discretion, it is for the legislature
itself to make that determination. The alternative raises the spectre of
a state government grinding to a halt for want of a delivery of paper, or
other such supplies, while a disgruntled contractor litigates his entitle-
ment to property rights which the legislature never intended to create.
CONCLUSION
In Polyvend, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District
found that bidders have a pre-contract property interest in doing busi-
ness with the state which requires due process protection. The opinion
ignores the reasoning used to find property interests in earlier United
States Supreme Court decisions. Because Polyvend does not clearly
identify the source of the bidder's alleged property interest, the opinion
is subject to a wide range of interpretations which are likely to confuse
141. See text accompanying notes 35-44 supra for a discussion of "mutually explicit under-
standings."
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.4 (1977).
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and foster procedural due process litigation in Illinois. The Polyvend
case was improperly decided and should be overturned.
C. PETER ERLINDER
